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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
---------------oooOooo--------------DALE RUCKER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
ARLIN DALTON,

Case No.

16082

Defendant and Respondent.
---------------oooOooo--------------BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT DALE RUCKER

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case was brought by appellant to recover damages
for defective worlcrnanship of respondent arising out of a contract in
which respondent was to construct an addition to a residence owned
by appellant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried without a jury before the Honorable
Allen B. Sorensen, Judge, on August 24, 1978, the Judge having
determined the matter to be an equitable proceeding.

Appellant was

granted judgment against respondent for plumbing deficiencies in the
sum of $2,000. 00, as well as court costs in the sum of $114.80.
Respondent's Counterclaim was dismissed, no cause of action.
Appellant was not granted judgment for structural deficiencies in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-1-OCR, may contain errors.
Machine-generated

the addition to the residence.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the trial court's Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Memorandum Decision with respect
to the structural deficiencies and the institution of a corresponding
increase in the judgment by this Court in favor of appellant of
$9,490.00 to a total judgment of $11,490.00.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the summer of 1976, appellant, a retired high school
auto mechanics instructor, approached respondent who misrepresented
hilnself to be a licensed general contractor, and inquired about the
possibility of respondent constructing an addition to a residence
owned by the appellant.

Appellant provided respondent with drawings

of the floor plan for the addition.

Respondent took the drawings and

prepared a quotation, including material and labor required to
construct the addition.
Respondent's quotation being the lower of two quotations
received by appellant, the appellant on July 19, 1976 accepted
respondent's offer.

The written agreement entered into by the parties

called for a total contract price of $11,247.50, which was to be paid
in installments.
The respondent selected an excavation company to dig the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-2Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

basement, contacted it to make arrangements for the digging, and
construction on the addition began.

The appellant was not consulted

on the selection of the excavation company, nor in the decision upon
how much it was to be paid.
The respondent hired other employees to do work on the
job, determined how much and when they were to be paid, without
any consultation with the appellant.

With respect to both the foundation

and the lumber used in the project, the respondent was responsible
for all decisions without consultation with the appellant.
Appellant paid respondent $11,050.00, leaving a balance
owed on the contract of $197.50, which balance appellant refused to
pay until respondent completed the work by correcting the deficiencies
in the home addition.

Respondent refused to correct the deficiencies

despite repeated requests by appellant.
Appellant did not hire or pay any subcontractors for work
included in the contract,

Payments to respondent did not represent

an hourly wage, but represented payments on the total contract price
included in the agreement of July 19, 1976.

Appellant never withheld

income taxes or social security taxes from any payments made to
respondent, nor did respondent ever submit time cards of hours
worked to appellant.
Appellant did not own or supply any of the tools used in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-3Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the construction of the addition,

Appellant did not control the day to

day activities of either the respondent or respondent's subcontractors,
Respondent acknowledges that some general direction by an owner is
to be expected.
The parties agreed, and the contract so stated, that
electrical work in the addition was not included in the contract.

The

parties also agreed orally that the heating work was likewise not
included in the contract.
The addition constructed by respondent contained several
structural deficiencies.

Many of those deficiencies were itemized in

certified letters sent to the contractor, respondent, and to the owner,
appellant, by the Provo Building Inspection Section, dated Jnne 21,
1977.

Shelby Adams, a building inspector for Provo City, testified

that the City has not and will not approve the addition until all the
deficiencies itemized in the June 21, 1977 letter are corrected.
Thomas Wayne Smith, a building contractor licensed by
the State of Utah for eight years testified that he examined the addition
on the residence owned by appellant, and that he observed n=erous
structural deficiencies.

He formed an opinion as to the cost of the

repair of those deficiencies so that the building would conform to the
building code, and he submitted to appellant his estimate as to that
cost.

He testified that his estimate of $9,490. 00 did not include

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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plumbing repairs with the single exception of a $500.00 estinlate to
repair a sewer line to fit and comply with the code.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
IN ITS ENTIRETY, THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
PARTIES CREATED AN EMPLOYER-INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR RELATIONSHIP AS A MATTER OF LAW
The general rule for determining whether or not an
individual was acting as an employee or as an independent contractor
is stated in 41 Am. Jur. Zd Independent Contractors

§ 5, pp. 744-745:

"
• it has generally been held that the
test of what constitutes independent service
lies in the control exercised, the decisive
question being who has the right to direct
what shall be done, and when and how it
shall be done, It has also been held that
commonly recognized tests of the
independent contractor relationship,
although not necessarily concurrent or each
in itself controlling, are the existence of
a contract for the performance by a
person of a certain piece or kind of work
at a fixed price, the independent nature
of his business or his distinct calling,
his employment of assistants with the
right to supervise their activities, his
obligation to furnish necessary tools,
supplies, and mate rials, his right to
control the progress of the work except
as to final results, the time for which
the workman is employed, the method
of payment, whether by tiine or by job,
and whether the work is part of the
regular business of the employer."
[Emphasis added]
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In accord with the general rule discussed above, this Court
has laid down guidelines for determining whether a party acted in the
capacity of an employee or an independent contractor.

In Harry L.

Young and Sons, Inc. vs. Ashton, 538 P. 2d 316, (Utah, 1975), this
Court in holding a truck driver to be an employee for purposes of
workmen's compensation benefits, said the following:
"Speaking in generality: An employee
is one who is hired and paid a salary,
a wage, or at a fixed rate, to perform
the employer's work as directed by the
employer and who is subject to a
comparatively high degree of control
in performing those duties. In contrast,
an independent contractor is one who
is engaged to do some particular
project or piece of work, usually for
a set total sum, who may do the job
in his own way, subject to only
miniinal restrictions or controls and
is responsible only for its satisfactory
completion. "
(Emphasis added] (At 318]
In Foster vs. Steed, 19 Utah 2d 435, 432 P. 2d 60 (1967),

this Court in holding that a master-servant relationship did not exist
between an oil company and service station operators, quoted the
following language from 83 A. L. R. 2d 1284, Anno: Gasoline Dealer-Status:
"In general, the determinative question
has usually been posed as one of 'control',
the view being that if the defendant controls,
or has the right of control, the manner in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-6- by the Utah State Library.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
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which the operations are to be carried
out, the defendant is liable as a master,
while, if the control extends only to the
result to be achieved, the actor is
regarded as an independent contractor, .•• "
[Emphasis added] [At 62]
In Whyte vs. Christensen, 550 P. 2d 1289 (Utah, 1976),

this Court made clear that the above-described test for determining
the employer-independent contractor relationship was applicable in
a residential construction project.

In Whyte, supra, this Court

reviewed certain jury instructions given by the trial court in aiding
it to make a determination of the relationship between the defendant
homeowner and plaintiff worker.

The questions which were to be

considered together by the jury in its determination were as follows:
"1. Did the defendant have the right
to control the work of the plaintiff.
2. Did the defendant have the right to
terminate David Whyte or any other
craftsman at any time he saw fit?
3. Was the plaintiff working for wages
at an hourly rate, and did the defendant on
prior occasions pay him his wages based
on an hourly rate?
4. Did the defendant have the right
to make additions to the alterations to
his home, or to subtract at any time
from instructions given on a prior occasion?"
[Id., at 1290]
In Whyte, supra,

the defendant had hired a fellow post

office employee to assist him in the construction of an addition to
his residence.

The defendant had little experience in construction
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work, but the plaintiff had substantial experience as a carpenter and
builder, although he was not a licensed contractor.

However, at this

point, any slinilarity between Whyte, supra, and the instant case ends.
In Whyte, supra, the plaintiff builder was to be paid at a flat hourly

rate, as were his two sons who assisted in the construction work.

In

Whyte, supra, the homeowner was responsible for paying for all of
the materials which were used in the construction project.

In "Whyte,

supra, construction work was not the worker's full time profession.
In the instant case, the respondent was not paid on an hourly basis, but
was paid a fixed contract price, including materials and labor which
resulted from a written bid prepared by respondent.

In the instant

case, the respondent's full tline employment is in the construction
trade.

(R. 90) Plaintiff's Exhibit #5 is a card given to appellant by

respondent which expressly states that respondent performed
contracting work of all kinds, including "steel buildings, plastering,
fireplaces, brick, concrete, marble crest, remodeling".

As will be

discussed subsequently, respondent's activities clearly demonstrate
that he was acting as an independent contractor, and not as an
employee.
The fundamental significance of Whyte, supra, upon the
instant case is that this Court applied the traditional test to a
residential construction project and that the trial court instructions
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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pertaining to the test clearly indicate that the relationship in the
instant case was that of an independent contractor.
The Utah cases are consistent with other jurisdictions in
the surrounding area.

The cases make clear that the fundainental

test is whether or not the employer has the right to control the day
to day means through which the ends of the project are accomplished.
Further, consistent with Harry L. Young and Sons, Inc. vs.
Ashton, supra, the cases are in agreement that the exercise of some
limited control by an employer over work being done will not make
a worker an employee, rather than an independent contractor.

See

Roybal vs. Bates Lumber Company, 76 N.M. 127, 412 P. 2d 555
(1966); Scott vs. Murphy Corporation, 79 N.M. 697, 448 P. 2d 803
(1969); Bowden vs. Robert V. Burggraf Construction Co., 375 P. 2d
532 (Idaho, 1962); and Great American Insurance Company vs.
General Insurance Company of America, 475 P. 2d 415 (Or., 1970).
The case law discussed above leads to the inescapable
conclusion that in the instant case the relationship between the parties
was that of an employer-independent contractor.

The evidence

introduced at trial conclusively demonstrates that as a matter of law,
the respondent was acting as an independent contractor.
By the agreement dated July 19, 1976, (plaintiff's Exhibit
#1 ), the respondent contractually obligated himself to construct a

-9- provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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16' x 37' addition to the east side of the appellant's home.

He was not

at liberty to begin construction without finishing the addition, as he
was not receiving hourly wages for the work that was performed.

In

contrast, an employee can terminate his relationship with his employer
at his own discretion, and is not obligated to complete the task that he
was engaged in.

Singer Sewing Mach. Co. vs. Industrial Commission

of Utah, et al., 104 Utah 175, 134 P.Zd 479 (1943);

Brubaker vs.

Glenrock Lodge International Order of Odd Fellows, 526 P. Zd 52
(Wyo., 1974).
The respondent was responsible for hiring his own employees
and subcontractors.
subcontractors

In addition, appellant did not pay any of the

(R. 12).

Respondent admits that he hired the

excavator, as well as other employees without consulting the appellant,
either with respect to whom was to be hired or how much they were
to be paid (R. 93, 94).
The contract price was fixed and included both material
and labor charges.
(R. 12).

Appellant did not pay respondent an hourly wage

Respondent admits that appellant never withheld any income

taxes or social security taxes from any payments made to him, and
that respondent never submitted any record of hours worked to the
appellant (R. 114 ).
The respondent modified construction plans on both the

-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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roof a:od pllliTlbing (R. 13).
Respondent also admits that some general direction and
guidance by a homeowner is to be expected in any construction project
ofthissort(R.llS).
In its decision, the trial court necessarily concluded that

the respondent had contractually obligated hiinself to perform the
plwnbing work in the addition, and that as a result of defects in the
plumbing work, was liable to the appellant for the reasonable. cost
for repair.

It is difficult to understand how the respondent can be

an independent contractor on the plumbing, as per the agreement
dated July 19, 1976, without also being an independent contractor for
the balance of the items included in the July 19, 1976 agreement.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY REACHED ITS DECISION
BY FOCUSING UPON THE AMBIGUITY OF THE RESPONDENT'S
OBLIGATIONS INSTEAD OF FOCUSING UPON THE
MANNER IN WHICH THE RESPONDENT PERFORMED
THOSE OBLIGATIONS.
The trial court erroneously decided that the agreement was
unclear as to the existence of the obligations of each party.

In both

the Memorandum Decision and the Findings of Fact, the trial court
stated that the plaintiff (appellant herein) had failed to establish the
existence of the defendant 1 s (respondent herein) obligations resulting
from the July 19, 1976 agreement between the parties, other than

-11-
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with respecc to the plumbing.

It concluded that it was unclear if

respondent was responsible for the structural work and other work
which was performed in a shoddy, unworkmanlike manner.
Had the dispute arisen as to whether or not the agreement
called for the respondent to perform certain obligations (as for
example, was the respondent to wallpaper the drywall, or carpet the
floors), the trial court's analysis would have merit.

However, the

dispute instead focuses upon whether the respondent performed his
acknowledged responsibilities in a workmanlike proper fashion.
parties agree that the contract was binding upon them.

The

The parties

further agree that the heating and electrical work was to be excluded
from the contract price.

The agreement called for the respondent

to build a 16' x 37' addition onto the existing dwelling.

Although not

specified in the agreement, the respondent was given and acknowledges
receiving a drawing of the floor plan for the addition, (R. 94 ).

It was

this drawing he took to Anderson Lumber to price out materials,

which along with labor charges became the basis of his quotation price.
It is inconceivable that the trial court could acknowledge

that the agreement between the parties obligated the respondent with
respect to the plumbing without also obligating the respondent with
respect to the other items contained in the agreement.

It is

significant that the plumbing estimate in the agreement represented

-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

only S'", of the monies paid by the appellant to the respondent.

Despite

this, the trial court concluded that the other $10,000.00 paid to the
respondent did not obligate the respondent any further.
POINT III.
THE ADDITION BUILT BY THE RESPONDENT HAD
SUBSTANTIAL STRUCTURAL DEFICIENCIES
FOR WHICH THE RESPONDENT IS RESPONSIBLE.
The written agreement between the parties and the testimony
at trial clearly demonstrate that the respondent obligated himself to
construct a 16 1 x 37' addition on the side of the appellant's home.

The

agreement specifically obligated the respondent to supply the
materials and labor for the construction of the structure.

The

agreement also shows that the respondent was obligated to perform
the exterior masonry work for the addition.

By his own admission,

respondent acknowledges that he was responsible for plastering the
interior walls (R. 96 ).
Regardless of any potential ambiguity in the contract
prepared by respondent, the evidence introduced at trial makes it
clear that the respondent was to erect a finished addition on the
appellant's residence.

The only items in the construction project

for which the respondent was not responsible were the electrical
and heating activities.

Respondent made arrangements for digging

a basement, pouring the foundation, erecting the main frame,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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building a roof, plastering the walls, installing the plwnbing and
fi...~tures,

floor.

and installing windows in the basement and on the main

Further, respondent was to place a marble finish on the

exterior of the addition.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit

# 1, R. 96)

The testimony and exhibits at trial clearly demonstrate
that the addition built by respondent contains numerous structural
and other deficiencies which must be corrected before the addition
will meet the Provo building code.
The Record makes it clear that the addition built by the
respondent is a disaster.

Shelby Adams, a building inspector for

Provo City, testified that an inspection of the addition was made by
the Provo City Building Inspection Section, and that numerous
deficiencies were found.

Those deficiencies were surrunarized in a

certified letter sent to the respondent by the Building Inspection
Section on June 21, 1977 (Plaintiff's Exhibit #6).

In addition to

various plwnbing deficiencies, numerous structural deficiencies were
itemized, including:
"1. No handrail combination on stairs to
basement.
2. Stair risers do not conform to code.
They vary from 8-1/4" to 10-5/8" and
treads are also irregular.
3. Window wells are needed but missing.
4. Shower floor is breaking up.
5. Poor joists on window casings.
6. Notching of floor joist in middle of span.

-14-
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7. Sub-standard head room in stairway.
8. Removed floor joist support.
9. Bathroom door strike plate missing.
10. Joints on sheetrock are miserable.
11. Bathroom door and casing do not fit
properly.
12. Rear door casing is loose.
13. No base shoe molding in hall and
bedrooms.
14. Floor underlayment not properly
nailed in bedrooms.
15. There is a 1-1/2" difference in floor
level between existing and new.
16. Window sill height 67-1/4" where 44"
maximum is allowed.
17. Sub-standard ceiling height. (7'1").
18. Irregular stair risers to furnace
room (9 3/4" to 7 3/4").
19. Interior window between existing bath
window and new hallway is not filled in.
20. Stair stringers are inadequate."

Mr. Adams further testified that the City has not approved,
and will not approve the addition until the objections in the letter
itemized above are corrected (R. 62).
Numerous photographs contained in the Record herein
were introduced as plaintiff's exhibits at trial.

The photographs

help illustrate the extremely shoddy workmanship associated with
this construction project.

All of the deficiencies revealed in the

photographs are respondent's responsibility.

None of the deficiencies

are in any way related to any electrical and heating work.
Plaintiff's Exhibit #21 shows the exterior surface of the
addition with numerous cracks running throughout the surface.

-15-
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Plaintiff's Exhibits #13, #14, #15, and "'27 reveal the
uneven and in smne cases crumbling plastering of the walls.
Plaintiff's Exhibit #29 shows the lack of support at the top
of the stairway running down to the basement in the addition.
Plaintiff's Exhibit #l 0 shows the lack of window wells in
the basement windows.
Plaintiff's Exhibits #9 and #31 show the cuts in the supporting
joists which resulted in a sagging in the main frame of the home.
Mr. John Conway of the Utah Business Regulations and
the Department of Contractors testified that on May 13, 1977, a
meeting was held with Shelby Adams, Mr. Rucker, and hilnself, at
which the mrrnerous deficiencies were itemized (R. 84).

He further

testified that the deficiencies originally itemized were found still to
exist as of August 14, 1978, on which date various photographs
depicting those deficiencies were taken in his presence (R. 84 ).
Mr. Thomas W. Smith, an experienced licensed building
contractor in the State of Utah, testified that he found various
structural deficiencies in the addition (R. 73, 74).

He further

testified that he had prepared an estimate as to the repair costs for
these structural deficiencies.

The estilnate of $9,490.00 pertained

exclusively to the structural deficiencies which he noted with the
single exception of a $500.00 item for sewer repair (R. 76, 77).

-16-provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Mr. Smith's qualifications to prepare an estimate are
unchallenged.

He has eight years experience as. a licensed building

contractor in the State of Utah (R. 73).

Further, he was familiar

with the work that building the addition required because he had
previously prepared a bid on the project (R. 75).
The reasonableness of the repair estimate is readily
demonstrable.

In its judgment, the court awarded $2,000.00 in

damages for repair to the plumbing whose original construction
estimate was approximately $1, 000.00.

Yet, as Mr. W. D. Pons

testified, commenting on the cost of repairs:
"Something like that amounts to
two jobs. You have to disassemble
it, and assemble it again. So,
naturally, the cost might run up to
double the amount • • • "

[R. 68]
Applying this analysis to the original construction estimate,
the $9,490.00 repair estimate is quite reasonable, given the scope
of repairs required to be made.
POINT IV.
HAVING BEEN HEARD BY THE TRIAL COURT AS A CASE IN
EQUITY, THIS COURT MAY REVIEW THE FACTS, MAKE AN
INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS OF THEM, Al'l"D GRANT
JUDGMENT OF ITS OWN ACCORD.
At the Pretrial Conference, the trial court characterized
the proceedings as one in equity, and on this basis, a non-jury trial
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was conducted.

It is well established that this Court on appeal can

render its own judgncent.
The Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 9, provides:
"From all final judgments of the district
courts, there shall be a right of appeal to
the Supreme Court. The appeal shall be
upon the record made in the court below
and under such regulations as may be
provided by law. In equity cases the appeal
may be on questions of both law and fact;
in cases at law the appeal shall be on
questions of law alone. Appeals shall also
lie from the final orders and decrees of
the Court in the administration of
decedent estates, and in cases of
guardianship, as shall be provided by law.
Appeals shall also lie from the final
judgncent of justices of the peace in civil
and criininal cases to the District Courts
on both questions of law and fact, with such
liinitations and restrictions as shall be
provided by law; and the decision of the
District Courts on such appeals shall be
final, except in cases involving the
validity or constitutionality of a statute."
[Emphasis added]
This Court has exercised its authority to issue its own
judgment rather than remand for retrial in equitable actions.

In

Creer vs. Thurman, 581 P. 2d 149 (Utah, 1978), this Court reversed
an order of the trial court awarding specific performance or dan1ages
to the purchasers in a suit on an oral agreement to convey land.

On

appeal, this Court reviewed the trial record and held that the
agreement to convey had been conditional, and which condition had
not occurred.

Accordingly, this Court reversed the order of the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,-18may contain errors.

trial court and entered judgment for tr_e defendant seller.
This Court may enter judgment for appellant by
determining that the judgment of the trial court was against the weight
of the evidence, even if this Court should conclude that the evidence
did not mandate judgment for the appellant in the trial court as a
matter of law.

Ream vs. Fitzen, 581 P. 2d 145 (Utah, 1978); Bear

River State Bank vs. Merrill, 101 Utah 176, 120 P.2d 325 (1941).
Sur rounding jurisdictions have adopted a similar position
regarding the right of the appellate court to make an independent
analysis of the facts in an equitable proceeding.

ln Starr vs.

International Realty, Ltd., 271 Or. 396, 533 P.2d 165 (1975), an
equitable suit was brought by the partners in a real estate venture
to require the realtor and promoter of the venture to render an
accounting to the partnership for commissions from purchased real
estate.

In modifying the trial court judgment, the Oregon Supreme

Court stated:
"[A]lthough we accord great weight to
the decision of the trial court on this
question, as we ordinarily do on
all such questions in suits in equity,
it must be kept in mind that this is
an appeal in a suit in equity, which
we try de novo. 11
[Id., at 170]
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independent CG7lt~·actor reL2~1 <lS~:ip as a rnaltcr of ld.\'/.

J\ revie\v of

the evidence clearly indica:e e :ha: all of the factors point111g towards
an independent contractor determination arc= applicable to the
respondent i.'1 the instant case.

_;,.,s such, the respondent is responsib),

for all of the deficient construction pursuant to the contract between
the parties.
The evidence clearly i.'l.dicates that the agreement entered
into between the parties placed substantial obligations upon the
respondent,

The evidence further indicates that the respondent

performed these obligations in a shoddy unworkrnanlike manner
resulting in serious structural deficiencies to the addition,
Employees of both the Provo Building Inspection Section
and the Utah Department of Contractors testified as to the existence
of these deficiencies, and indicated that these deficiencies must be
corrected before the Provo City Building Inspection Section will
approve the addition,

Costs of repair of these deficiencies was

determined by a licensed building contractor for the State of Utah
with eight years experience.

The reasonableness of this repair

e stiinate was unchallenged.
Even if this Court should be unable to conclude that as a
matter of law respondent is responsible for these structural
deficiencies, this Court may reverse the decision of the trial court
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2:1c: institute judl!;ment for appellant.

Article VIII, Section 9 of the

C:2'1 Constitution authorizes this Court to make an independent analysis
of both the law and the facts in equitable proceedings.

Having been

determined to be an equitable proceeding at the trial court, this
Court may institute judgment for appellant either as a matter of law
or as a result of making its own appraisal of the facts in this equitable
proceeding.
Appellant requests this Court to institute an increase in the
judgment in favor of appellant of $9,490.00 for a total of $11,490.00
against respondent as a result of the deficient workmanship in the
addition for which respondent is responsible.
Dated this

5th day of December, 1978.
Respectfully submitted,

32 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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